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HEIDEGGER’S PHILOSOPHY OF TECHNOLOGY

By SHIDARTA (June 2026)

There is an intriguing remark by the German physicist Werner Heisenberg when explaining the relationship between humans and technology. According to him, this relationship can be likened to a spider and its web. The two are inseparable. The web is a technology inseparable from the spider’s life (Francis Lim, 2008). Of course, we are not spiders that, over time, can only produce a single design of a web with the sole function of trapping passing insects. As homo faber, humans are creators of technology.

From a philosophical perspective, technology has multiple facets. At the epistemological level, the philosophy of technology addresses the nature of technology. At the metaphysical level, it questions what is natural/artificial and human/inhuman about a technology. From an ethical standpoint, it examines the good and bad consequences of technological use. There are also political questions, namely how humans live in a technological society, how technology reshapes ways of life and social relations, and who determines policies regarding technological implementation (Yesaya Sandang, 2013).

Concerning these perspectives, a German philosopher (from Freiburg and Berlin), Martin Heidegger (1889–1976), particularly in his work The Question Concerning Technology, articulated his existential stance toward technology. I attempt to illustrate Heidegger’s perspective with a simple illustration as follows:

In addition to being an existential philosopher, Heidegger was also a prominent figure in hermeneutics (though he did not always use this label). In his philosophy of technology, Heidegger also employed hermeneutics to seek answers to the question: what does technology do to the way humans are in the world? On one hand, Heidegger emphasized humans as Dasein, possessing the capacity to interpret; yet, he also allowed room for the world to hold an “unconcealment” that can exist beyond human beings. Although he did not explicitly state that non-humans interpret, there is an interpretation that this openness does not belong entirely to us. We will touch on this further toward the end of this writing.

According to him, technology is not merely an instrument, but a way we comprehend the world. Technology is not neutral. It has the potential to trap humans in an overly narrow perspective and cause them to lose sight of a deeper relationship with the essence of their existence. Heidegger positioned technology as a frame. Like any frame, it can only reveal the reality of existence (the world) within its boundaries. This mode of revealing within a frame is what he termed Gestell (enframing).

According to him, modern technology tends to “dictate” how humans perceive everything. Technological intervention creeps in subtly, often without human awareness. Gestell frames the world through a calculative mode of revealing. Consequently, we begin to regard everything—including the universe, the world, living beings, and even human beings themselves—as resources to be controlled and optimized. Ultimately, these resources merely become something standing by ready for exploitation (standing-reserve; Bestand). For example, technology perceives a forest merely as timber, or the wildlife within it as mere commodities.

Thus, in Heidegger’s eyes: “The essence of technology is nothing technological.” Revealing existence strictly within a technological frame (technological mode) inevitably carries a diminishing peril. We might even formulate the premise that the more efficient technology becomes, the greater the risk that humans lose meaning. Therefore, Heidegger offered a viewpoint that, at first glance, seems to invite us back to the traditional revealing of Ancient Greece, commonly known as poiesis. Literally, this concept means letting something come forth and reveal itself (bringing-forth). When technology in the modern era intruded into our lives, it no longer appeared by way of poiesis; instead, it forced, demanded, controlled, and optimized. A forest is no longer a forest as it is, but rather turned into stacks of timber evaluated by how many cubic meters it yields and how many millions of dollars it can generate when exported.

Heidegger’s philosophy of technology then moves into a concept he referred to as Gelassenheit. This concept emerges notably in his later works, particularly his essays and speeches compiled in the book Discourse on Thinking.

No single word can precisely encapsulate what Gelassenheit means. It is typically translated as releasement, letting-be, serenity, or detached openness. The concept of Gelassenheit is essential because it demonstrates that Heidegger was not anti-technology. Gelassenheit is also a disposition that allows the space of poiesis to remain open amid the modern world. It is this attitude that makes room for the realization that the world possesses an “unconcealment” capable of existing beyond humanity.

Thus, Heidegger urges us to remain watchful so that we can discover a more authentic relationship with the world beyond mere technical utility. For Heidegger, technology is no longer just a tool or a machine, but a way or process of human thinking in revealing existence. This means that a forest is not merely lumber. A forest also signifies an ecosystem, a sanctuary for wildlife, cultural heritage, a loan from future generations, a sacred space for indigenous communities, an aesthetic landscape, the lungs of the earth, and much more. If Gestell asks: “What is the forest for?” then Gelassenheit asks: “What does the forest itself wish to reveal?” In other words, *Gelassenheit* does not ask “What is the utility of the forest?”, but rather “How does the forest disclose itself?”

Gelassenheit, therefore, ultimately leads to two ways of relating to technology in this contemporary era: yes or no! Through the concept of Gelassenheit, Heidegger provides the rationale for why we must say yes, and why we must say no.

I would like to conclude this writing by reflecting on the use of artificial intelligence as a form of technology. I believe that artificial intelligence warrants an approach through Heidegger’s existential attitude of Gelassenheit.

The ethics of artificial intelligence usage is frequently formulated through the values of human-centeredness and inclusiveness. These two ethical values must be interpreted with great care so that we know at what juncture we must center on humanity and when we must be inclusive.

Drawing upon Heidegger’s thought, we might define human-centeredness in line with his notion that only Dasein (humanity) can inquire about “Being.” A tree cannot interpret, a bird does not interpret, a stone does not interpret, and even artificial intelligence does not interpret. Only humans interpret. The subject of Gelassenheit remains the human being! In this sense, Heidegger remains somewhat anthropocentric. Yet, humans are not the center of reality. Heidegger was not a proponent of classical humanism, which posits that humans are masters of the world and nature was created for humanity. Heidegger would argue that human beings are the shepherds of Being (shepherd of Being). Humans do not create meaning; rather, they listen to unconcealment. In this regard, human interests are no longer the sole consideration. Artificial intelligence, for instance, must not exist exclusively for human interests, but also for the well-being of other subjects. It must not undermine civilization, pollute the environment, discriminate against its users, and so on. It is precisely in this aspect that inclusiveness becomes an indispensable value attached to artificial intelligence. (***)

This article is a translation of the following Indonesian article: https://business-law.binus.ac.id/2026/06/21/filsafat-teknologi-heidegger/

 

 

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