By SHIDARTA (August 2026)

In one of the video series I uploaded to my YouTube channel (see the link at the end of this article), I once gave a presentation entitled “Norms, Principles, and Values.” In that video, I explained that there is a substantive hierarchy among the three. Norms occupy the most concrete level, while values occupy the most abstract level. Between the two lies the principle.

Several years after the video was released, I initiated a series of readings of legal theory textbooks, inviting colleagues from various universities to share their readings with one another. The first book we read was J.J.H. Bruggink’s Rechsreflecties, followed by Humberto Ávila’s Theory of Legal Principles. The third book was written by Frederick Schauer (Playing by the Rule). This was followed by Joseph Raz’s The Concept of a Legal System. At the time this article was written, the fifth book being read together was the work of a Polish legal theorist named Jerzy Wróblewski, The Judicial Application of Law. One of the many issues discussed in these legal theory books concerns terminology. Two terms that I find particularly interesting to clarify, notwithstanding the fact that this terminological problem has already been discussed by many scholars, are “rule” and “norm.”

In Dutch, the term “legal norm” is referred to as “rechtsnorm” (plural: rechtsnormen). In English, it is called a “legal norm.” In Indonesia, we often use the word kaidah as a substitute for norma. The difference between norma and kaidah goes beyond their etymological origins. Norma derives from Latin, which may be regarded as the parent language of most European languages, whereas kaidah derives from Arabic (قَاعِدَة). More or less the same applies to the words “principle” (principles) and asas (أساس).

Hans Kelsen was a figure who, from the outset, was deeply concerned with distinguishing these two terminologies. For him, this was not merely a semantic matter. In his book General Theory of Law and State (English edition, 1949: 37–38), he wrote extensively about the “general and individual norm.” In essence, he objected to using the word “rule” (Regel) when it carried the connotation of law in the juridical sense. He preferred to use the word “norm”. There were two reasons for his objection.

First, rule may obscure the distinction between the laws of nature (physics) and law as a norm. Both are often referred to as rules, even though their characteristics are different. Natural laws explain how an event actually occurs and the factors that cause it. Legal norms, by contrast, do not describe actual human behavior or the causes of such behavior. Legal norms determine how human beings ought to behave. In other words, natural laws describe how factual events occur according to causality. Law in the juridical sense prescribes how human beings ought to behave. The distinction between the descriptive (natural law) and the prescriptive (juridical law) is the distinction between the realm of is and ought. Because of this distinction, the term “norm” is more appropriate for describing law than the term “rule.”

Second, the word rule carries a connotation of generality because the term “rule” is directed toward a group of people or a class of recurring (repetitive) events. A rule states that a particular consequence always or almost always occurs or ought to occur (when certain conditions are fulfilled). Thus, if juridical law is always equated with rule, juridical law would appear to consist only of general norms, such as statutes. Yet a legal system also encompasses individual norms, namely norms that apply only to particular subjects and cases. A court decision is an example of such an individual norm. For example, a judge orders debtor A to pay 1,000 dollars to creditor B. With the threat of civil sanctions in the event of non-compliance, the decision obliges A to pay a certain amount of money to B. The judge’s decision is also law in the juridical sense, just as a general legal norm serves as its basis.

To reiterate, I would emphasize that Kelsen chose norm because the term indicates the prescriptive character of law while encompassing both general and individual norms. By contrast, rule potentially obscures the normative character of law and narrows law down to provisions of a general nature. Thus, norm is more appropriate because it can simultaneously explain: (1) the modality of law: law states what ought to be done; and (2) the scope of law: law consists of both general and individual norms. It should be noted that Kelsen did not say that using rule is necessarily wrong in all circumstances. His objection is better understood as meaning that the term can be theoretically misleading when used as the primary term for explaining the nature of law.

On the basis of the explanation above, Kelsen further saw the binding force and validity (Geltung) of law as lying in its character as a norm, rather than as a rule carrying the connotation of generality. From this, we can finally understand why Kelsen’s theory is called the “Pure Norm Theory of Law” and not the “Pure Rule Theory of Law.” When Kelsen sought to purify law, what he purified was the norm. This is because the essence of law lies precisely in that norm.

We now turn to J.J.H. Bruggink. This Dutch author adopts a different perspective. He argues that a norm (kaidah) is the meaning of a legal rule (rechtsregel). Humberto Ávila conveys more or less the same idea. “Norms are neither text nor a set of texts, but the meanings construed from the systematic interpretation of normative texts,” he writes in the first paragraph of Chapter II of Theory of Legal Principles. Ávila states that norms can take the form of “rules” as well as principles (principles). I try to imagine an analogy: in the eyes of Bruggink and Ávila, the rule is like a snail’s shell, while the norm is the living body of the snail inhabiting that shell. From the outside, what we see is the shell. The shell may be called the legal text. The text becomes explicit and manifests itself as a rule and/or principle, while what is implicitly contained within it is the norm. Thus, a norm is the meaning constructed through the interpretation of a text (rule/principle). Their relationship can be formulated as follows:

legal text (rule/principle) → interpretation → norm

In other words, the text is the object of interpretation, while the norm is the result of that interpretation.

I myself tend to agree more with Kelsen’s explanation than with Bruggink’s and Ávila’s. A rule, or more specifically a legal rule (rechtsregel), is indeed more concrete or more explicit than a norm. The same, however, cannot be said of principles. A principle basically does not require explicitness because it inhabits the area behind the text, even behind the norm. Therefore, the study of principles is one form of metanormative study. Accordingly, we can arrange the concepts from the most abstract to the most concrete as follows: value, principle, and norm. If we continue the sequence, we can then add the text.

Although we may initially understand that a text is an explicit expression of a norm, and therefore more concrete than a norm, I still want to be cautious about using this terminology. This is because I must be prepared to answer the question: Can a text contain only one norm?

It should not be understood that way. At one point, a text may serve as the basis for constructing several norms simultaneously, while in another situation several texts may together construct only one norm. In yet another situation, there may be a norm constructed without relying on any particular text. There may even be a particular text that does not construct an independent norm. The following table may clarify what is meant:

From the word “norm,” we then move to the term “normative.” Let us elaborate by asking the following question: Is every norm always normative in character?

Bruggink argues that the term normative has a dual meaning. First, all concepts that exist within a normative context may be called normative. More or less, Bruggink is saying that normative here is an adjective derived from norm, so there can be no norm that is not normative. However, normative also carries a second meaning, namely that it refers to a concept containing evaluative content. An evaluative concept is one through which people assess whether a person or an object can be included within a particular category or not. Bruggink gives as an example Article 1 of the Constitution of the Kingdom of the Netherlands. The provision reads, in translation:

All persons in the Netherlands shall be treated equally in equal circumstances. Discrimination on the grounds of religion, belief, political opinion, race or sex or on any other grounds whatsoever shall not be permitted.

Article 1 of the Dutch Constitution concerns the prohibition of discrimination. This provision is called normative because we can assess whether a person’s behavior or a policy falls within the category prohibited by Article 1. Such assessment may be called objective (when its benchmark is provided generally by law), but it may also be subjective (depending on the assessment of the competent official).

The distinction between norm and normative, if we follow Bruggink’s second meaning above, remains confusing! This is because we cannot encounter a norm while entirely separating ourselves from evaluation, regardless of whether that evaluation is objective or subjective. Even provisions containing definitions (for example, provisions in the General Provisions chapter) are provisions to which we can apply an evaluation. For example, one item in Article 1 of the Indonesian Manpower Law states: “The Minister means the minister responsible for manpower affairs.” Does this provision contain a normative or non-normative concept? Such a provision is in fact still normative because, if a minister whose portfolio is finance, for example, issues a policy on the basis of the authority of the minister provided for in the Manpower Law, we can assess that he is not the minister referred to by that law.

Therefore, I tend to distinguish the meanings of “norm” and “normative” by relying only on Bruggink’s first meaning. Any provision may be called normative insofar as it is prescriptive, namely insofar as it directs someone to do or not to do something. All legal texts (in the juridical sense) are normative texts!

I take the view that the normative character of a legal text is not attached only to the primary norm or behavioral norm. This is because the primary norm itself cannot be properly understood (except at a merely grammatical level) without conducting a study of metanorms, which means that an analysis of secondary norms must also be included (note: H.L.A. Hart uses the term “secondary rules”). Through such a comprehensive reading, the meaning of the primary norm becomes much clearer. This is consistent with Ávila’s understanding when he says that a norm is the result of “systematic interpretation of normative texts.” Thus, the position of secondary norms becomes highly important, and they can still be given a prescriptive assessment. An example is the definition provisions contained in the General Provisions chapter. The definition of “minister” in the Manpower Law may appear at first glance to be non-prescriptive because it contains no normative operator. However, if someone asks, “Can the Minister of Finance issue a policy based on the Manpower Law?”, the answer to this question can still refer to the provision in the General Provisions chapter. (***)

This article is a translation of the following Indonesian article: https://business-law.binus.ac.id/2026/08/04/rule-atau-norm/