By SHIDARTA (June 2026)

In the previous article, we introduced the philosophy of technology of Martin Heidegger (see the link at the end of this article). This time, we aim to complement Heidegger’s perspective with the thoughts of another philosopher, Don Ihde.

Don Ihde (1934–2024) was a contemporary American philosopher widely recognized for his extensive focus on the philosophy of technology. Some of his well-known works include Experimental Phenomenology: An Introduction (1977) and Technics and Praxis: A Philosophy of Technology (1979). Unlike Heidegger, who also addressed the philosophy of technology from an existential philosophical foundation, Don Ihde chose to focus more on everyday experiences when we interact with technology. In essence, he placed greater emphasis on our concrete interactions with instruments (technologies) and how these instruments shape our experiences. According to him, human beings never experience the world purely and directly; our experiences are always mediated by objects, instruments, and technologies. In other words, he emphasized the role of technology in mediating the relationship between humans and the world. Ihde concluded that technology can expand our perception of reality (the world), while simultaneously shaping the way we comprehend it. Human experience invariably occurs through the materiality of technology. This is what subsequently led him to refer to himself as a phenomenological materialist.

This label itself holds the potential to be misunderstood. This is because the term “phenomenon” is vast, and not all phenomena necessarily require technological mediation. Phenomena such as sadness, fear, or love cannot be mediated by technology. Thus, it is true that not all phenomena are technological! However, the term “phenomenological” remains fitting because Ihde did not intend to argue that all phenomena are technological; rather, he argued that whenever technology is present, we must examine how it alters the way a phenomenon appears to humans. The aforementioned label reiterates his framework of thought: Human – Technology – World. Read in reverse, we can state that the world presents itself to humans through various forms of technological mediation.

In contrast to Heidegger, who tended to view the impact of technology pessimistically, Ihde did not regard technology as a metaphysical threat. Instead, he was intrigued by how technology enriches our experiences and opens up manifold possibilities. We might say that Heidegger was more critical and saw the peril of total technologization, whereas Ihde was more optimistic, celebrating our diverse interactions with technology.

I believe Ihde still remained cautious regarding the dangers of technological use. He noted that we must remain reflectively conscious of the role of technology. He encouraged us to unite technology with our awareness of context, preventing us from becoming trapped within it. For Ihde, by comprehending technology as something plural and contextual, we can maintain a critical stance without being overshadowed by excessive fear.

Above, we noted that Ihde discussed diversity and contextuality. More precisely, he underscored the presence of contextual plurality. This diversity does not merely concern the types of technology, but also relates to the manners in which technology enters our lives. Here, he stated that technology does not have to dominate or confine our perspective, given that technology is not the sole means through which we understand the world. At this juncture, Ihde appeared to “correct” Heidegger, who asserted that technology is a frame that inevitably constrains our grasp of reality. According to Ihde, the key lies not solely within the instrument itself, but in how we reflectively interpret it. Ihde emphasized that through such reflection, humans can sustain a balance so that technology does not dictate our way of life.

In connection with this diversity and contextuality, Ihde’s framework of technology mediating humans and the world—”Human – Technology – World”—must always be read across multiple relational modalities. That is, while technology remains situated in the middle, the pattern of relations can vary. To illustrate this, Ihde presented four types of relations: embodiment relation, hermeneutic relation, alterity relation, and background relation.

EMBODIMENT RELATION portrays technology as an extension of the human body. The schema is: (Human-Technology) -> World. This type of relation renders technology “transparent” because humans do not focus on the instrument itself, but rather on the world through the instrument. For instance, eyeglasses, microscopes, stethoscopes, white canes (for the visually impaired), and headsets are technologies that serve as extensions of our bodies. Taken to the extreme, we might say we are intimately joined with such technology. When wearing glasses, we are not looking at the glasses. Hence, an amusing situation can occur where someone searches everywhere for their glasses, even while actively wearing them. Our relation with artificial intelligence technologies used for automated translation or grammar checking can also be categorized under this embodiment relation, as our focus is not directed at the artificial intelligence, but rather at the text we are composing.

HERMENEUTIC RELATION occurs when technology is positioned as something requiring interpretation. The schema is: Human -> Technology -> World. In this relation, technology generates signs or representations, and it falls upon humans to interpret them. Technologies such as thermometers, speedometers, ECGs, MRIs, and data dashboards illustrate this dynamic. A physician, for example, does not observe an illness directly; instead, they read the numbers or symbols on the instrument and interpret them. Artificial intelligence technology also frequently displays this form of relation; AI data analyses or predictive outputs, for instance, are symbols that must be interpreted.

ALTERITY RELATION represents the third type. Here, technology assumes the role of “the Other.” The schema is: Human <-> Technology. This relational schema is intriguing because the “World” seemingly disappears from view. The world does not actually vanish; rather, it is temporarily bracketed because human attention is concentrated on the technology itself. In this relation, technology is treated like an entity with which one interacts. Examples include ATMs, chatbots, robots, virtual assistants, and ChatGPT. When engaging with them, we often ask, “What does ChatGPT think?” and it responds promptly. Thus, the technology becomes a “quasi-other.” It is clearly not human, yet it is treated as a conversational partner much like a human being.

BACKGROUND RELATION positions technology to operate in the background. In this relation, the technology is no longer consciously perceived because our focus remains on the world. However, this relation differs from the first. Technology such as air conditioning serves as the most apt example. We enjoy the cool air inside a room without needing to actively consider the cooling technology operating behind the comfort we feel. Similarly, Wi-Fi technology allows us to be immersed without giving thought to the Wi-Fi itself, simply enjoying seamless navigation through cyberspace. The technology operates quietly behind the scenes.

Now, when illustrating its schema, I find a somewhat problematic dilemma: when technology is positioned as the background, what or whom does it serve as a background to? Is it the background to the human, to the world, or to the relation between the two? I tend to favor framing the relation as: Human -> (Technology-World). First, this schema places this relation in sharp contrast to the embodiment relation. In the first relation, it is the human and the technology that merge. In this fourth relation, it is the world that merges with technology. The position of “technology” as a mediator remains centered between the human and the world.

If we draw a comparison with Heidegger, he seemed to position technology predominantly within this final type of relation. Technology has framed our way of viewing the world, and as a result, the world becomes confined strictly within the frame constructed by technology. For example, upon arriving in Bandung for the first time, one might claim that the city’s temperature is significantly cooler than Jakarta’s, without realizing that massive air conditioning units are blowing nearby. Heidegger tended to see a single overarching danger (Gestell) arising from such a relationship, whereas Ihde observed multiple possible relations. Technology can function as an extension of ourselves (embodiment), as a text to be interpreted (hermeneutic), as a conversational partner (alterity), or as an unseen background system (background). Precisely because of this plurality, Ihde maintained a more optimistic stance than Heidegger. For Ihde, there is no single “essence” of technology. Technology is always contingent upon the ongoing relations between humans, technology, and the world. (***)

This article is a translation of the following Indonesian article: https://business-law.binus.ac.id/2026/06/24/filsafat-teknologi-don-ihde/